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Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: A Violation
of Substantive Due Process?
In Hall v. Tawney,I the Fourth Circuit held that the infliction of
corporal punishment by a public school official may violate a school-
child's constitutional rights. The court determined that "there may be
circumstances under which specific corporal punishment administered
by state school officials gives rise to an independent federal cause of
action to vindicate substantive due process rights."' 2 Although the test
Hall proposed for determining a due process violation is extremely
stringent,3 the decision provides a framework for the analysis of the
substantive due process rights of students subjected to excessive physi-
cal punishment.
This Comment offers a brief introduction to corporal punishment
in public schools, early challenges to its use, and the doctrine of sub-
stantive due process. The student's interest in freedom from excessive
corporal punishment has its source in basic American values.4 The
Comment therefore suggests that this interest be explicitly recognized
as a fundamental right. The state has a legitimate,5 and perhaps com-
pelling,6 interest in maintaining classroom discipline. The Comment
further suggests, however, that severe physical punishment rarely, if
ever, serves the state's interest, and that the maintenance of classroom
order can be achieved by less restrictive means. The schoolchild's in-
terest in freedom from unreasonable physical punishment should there-
fore be afforded specific constitutional protection.
The principles of individual freedom embodied in the Constitution
should provide due process protection from physical punishment for
children as well as adults. Even if a child may not be entitled to consti-
tutional protection from all corporal punishment, the Constitution
should at least protect students from severe abuse at the hands of pub-
lic educators.
Corporal Punishment in the Public School
When a schoolchild misbehaves, the disciplinarian must decide
what punishment, if. any, to impose. Sanctions include verbal repri-
1. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
2. Id. at 611.
3. See note 201 & accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 249, 262, 265, 288 & text accompanying notes 245-90 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 26-27 infra.
6. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 299 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
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mands, additional assignments, withholding of privileges, detention,
exclusion from the classroom or school for varying periods, and corpo-
ral punishment. 7 Corporal punishment is defined as "[p]hysical pun-
ishment as distinguished from pecuniary punishment or a fine; any
kind of punishment of or inflicted on the body. ' 8 Although there is a
sharp division of opinion among both educators and the general public
regarding its use,9 corporal punishment remains an authorized method
of discipline in most public school systems.1l
For over two hundred years, Anglo-American law has allowed
school officials to punish disobedient students with physical force."l In
England, the doctrine of in loco parentis provided the basis for the
teacher's right to administer corporal punishment; parents delegated
part of their right to discipline to the school.12 The use of corporal
7. Note, School Discoline." The Administrator's Dilemma, 15 WILLAMETTE L. J. 531,
540 (1979) [hereinafter cited as School Disciline].
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
9. See note 287 & text accompanying notes 279, 287-90 infra. There has been exten-
sive commentary concerning corporal punishment. See, e.g., E. BOLMEIER, LEGALITY OF
STUDENT DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES (1976); H. FALK, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT (1941); J.
H{YMAN & J. WISE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1979); K. JAMES,
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1963); S. LEVINE & E. CARY, THE
RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 84-86 (rev. ed. 1977); NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON CORPORAL PUNISHMENT (1972); B. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 182-93 (1953); Reitman, Foilman, & Ladd, Corporal Punishment in Public
Schools, ACLU REPORT (1972).
10. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977).
11. R. MNOOKIN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW (1978); see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 660 (1977); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907
(1975). In denying the plaintiffs' claim that corporal punishment violated substantive due
process rights of the schoolchild in Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en
banc) afl'don other grounds, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Fifth Circuit noted that "[p]addling of
recalcitrant children has long been an accepted method of promoting good behavior and
instilling notions of responsibility and decorum into the mischievous heads of school chil-
dren." Id. at 917.
12. R. MNOOKIN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW (1978); see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at
662. As Blackstone wrote: "[A parent may] delegate part of his parental authority, during
his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is then in locoparentis, and has such a
portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correc-
tion, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed." 2 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 453 (T. Bookey ed. 1884).
For a discussion of in locoparentis, see Tripp, Acting "In Loco Parentis"As a Defense to
Assault and Battery, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 39 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 147 (1965); Note, In Loco Parentis and Due Process. Should These Doctrines Apply to Cor-
poral Punishment?, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 678, 678-81 (1974); Note, Corporal Punishment.- For
School Children Only, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 137, 149-51 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Corpo-
ral Punishment]; Note, Corporal Punishment: Forty Whacks With the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 869, 870 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Forty Whacks]. The Iowa
Supreme Court explained the doctrine of in locoparentis in a case at the turn of the century.
A mother had delegated her authority to punish her son to the child's aunt, who had in-
flicted moderate corporal punishment upon the boy. In denying the child's claim for dam-
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punishment in the United States as a method of disciplining students
predates the Revolution.' 3
The justification for the imposition of corporal punishment, how-
ever, has shifted from the doctrine of in locoparentis to a view more in
line with modem compulsory education laws:14 to maintain group dis-
cipline and educate the schoolchild properly, the state itself may im-
pose reasonable corporal punishment.' 5 The infliction of physical
punishment also may be based upon parental consent' 6 or upon statu-
tory authority. Most states statutorily authorize the teacher or principal
to administer moderate corporal punishment, at least in certain
situations.' 7
The objectives of punishment in the school were explained in an
early case' 8 in which a student sued her teacher for assault and battery:
ages, the court emphasized that "those having the care, custody, and control of minor
children may, for the purpose of proper discipline and control, administer such moderate
and reasonable chastisement as shall effect the desired object, and this rule has applied gen-
erally to all those occupying a position in locoparent/s." Rowe v. Rugg, 117 Iowa 606, 607,
91 N.W. 903 (1902), cited in Corporal Punishment, supra, at 149.
13. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 660.
14. Generally, it can no longer be contended that parents voluntarily delegate the au-
thority to punish their children to a public school. Rather, because the legislature in most
states has directed that all children under a certain age attend school, see, e.g., CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 48200 (West 1978), the school acts under a general delegation of state legislative
authority. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board.4uthority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: 4 Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 384 (1969).
15. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 662. As it is normally the parents who challenge
the school's exercise of disciplinary authority, the in locoparent/s theory is somewhat artifi-
cial. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27, at 136 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]; Project, Education andthe Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L.
REv.1373, 1455-56 (1976); see also Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300 (M.D.N.C.), affid,
423 U.S. 907 (1975).
Many courts, however, still rely on the in loco parentds rationale. See, e.g., People v.
Ball, 58 Ill. 2d 36, 317 N.E.2d 54 (1974); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 513, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 220, 223 (1969).
16. See, e.g., Sims v. Waln, 536 F.2d 686, 689 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 903
(1977).
17. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 49000-49001 (West 1978). For a list of such statutes,
see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 662 n.23. The Restatement (Second) of Torts also
recognizes the privilege to punish school children physically: "One other than a parent who
has been given by law. . . the function of controlling, training, or educating a child, is
privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement as he
reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training or education, except in so
far as the parent has restricted the privilege of one to whom he has entrusted the child."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(2) (1965). The restriction is removed in § 153(2),
which declares that such punishment may be imposed by a "public officer.. . notwith-
standing the parents' prohibitions or wishes." Public officers, including teachers in public
schools, "do not act as the delegates of the parent, but as officers of the State or municipality,
carrying out its public policy." Id. at § 153 comment c.
18. State v. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145 (1878), cited in CorporalPunishment, supra note 12, at
153-54.
May 1982]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
"irst], the reformation and highest good of the pupil; second, the en-
forcement and maintenance of correct discipline in school; and third, as
an example to like evil-doers."' 19 The particular justification for corpo-
ral punishment traditionally has been that, until the child's intellectual
and moral development is completed, physical discipline is an effective
means of both signaling and deterring unacceptable behavior.20 Severe
corporal punishment, however, may not be conducive to attaining these
goals.21
Constitutional Limits on Corporal Punishment
Respectful of the states' responsibility to provide for education, the
Supreme Court historically has been reluctant to intervene when con-
fronted with questions concerning the administration of public schools,
except perhaps in cases that raise issues of equal protection.22 The
Court has reasoned that education is a function of local governments, 23
and that school personnel are more experienced and skilled in the field
of education than are the courts.24 As states have authority over educa-
tion in public schools, federal interference can be justified only "in the
case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the
supreme law of the land."2 5
The Supreme Court also has recognized that at least some disci-
pline and order is necessary if the schools are to perform their educa-
tional function effectively. 26 Towards this end, the Court has
emphasized that the states have comprehensive authority to establish
19. 50 Iowa at 149.
20. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme
Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 781-82 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Garvey].
21. See notes 287-88 & text accompanying notes 285, 287-88 infra.
22. Note, Constitutional Law-The Children's Crusadefor Constitutional Recognition, 78
W. VA. L. REV. 192, 199 (1975); see, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Cum-
ming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899); cf Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated schools).
23. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). As the Supreme
Court recognized in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954), "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments."
(Emphasis added.) The responsibility for education may be provided for in the state's con-
stitution, see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art IX, and administered through comprehensive state laws.
Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1092, 1095
(1980). The California Education Code, for example, fills nine volumes.
24. Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201 (1971) (Black, J., opinion in chambers); see Note,
Constitutional Law-The Children's Crusadefor Constitutional Recognition, 78 W. VA. L.
REV. 192, 199-200 (1975).
25. Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899).
26. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). For a discussion of Goss, see note 50 &
text accompanying notes 50-52 infra.
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and enforce school disciplinary regulations. 27 Although the states set
some standards of conduct,28 state legislation delegates extensive disci-
plinary authority to school boards to establish rules and to discipline
students.29 Schools, in turn, are vested by the states and local boards
with broad power to maintain order.30
In carrying out their educational duties, however, schools must
take care not to infringe too greatly upon the constitutional rights of
their pupils. For example, in Epperson v. Arkansas,3 ' the Supreme
Court struck down a statute that prohibited the teaching of the theory
of evolution, because it violated first amendment rights. The Court
emphasized that "'[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms
is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.' "32
Similarly, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,33 the
Court upheld the right of a young Jehovah's Witness not to salute the
flag. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, emphasized that "scrupu-
lous protection" of individual rights is necessary when young people
are being educated for citizenship in a democratic society.34 He noted
that local authorities might feel less obligation than federal officials to
obey constitutional mandates and that the media might not publicize
constitutional violations at the local level.35 While acknowledging that
school boards have important duties requiring the exercise of judgment
and discretion, Justice Jackson warned that these responsibilities must
be performed within constitutional limits.3 6 Thus, although federal
courts are reluctant to become involved in local administrative and ed-
ucational policies, they will intervene in certain situations to protect a
student whose constitutional rights are abridged by public school
authorities.
27. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 589-90 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44810 (West 1978) (disorderly conduct).
29. Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Indiidual Rights, 74 MICH. L.
REv. 1373, 1455 (1976); see, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 35160-35162 (West 1978) (governing
boards' authority, powers, and duties). School boards generally are chosen directly or indi-
rectly by democratic process, and thus ultimately are answerable to their constituency.
Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards and the Constitution, 80 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 1092, 1095
(1980); see, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 35100-35103 (West 1978). For an exhaustive discus-
sion of school boards and educational authority, see Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of
School Board.Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analy-
sis, 117 U. PA. L. Rv. 373 (1969).
30. See note 29 supra.
31. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
32. Id. at 104 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (footnote omitted)).
33. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
34. Id. at 637.
35. Id. at 637-38.
36. Id. at 637.
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The Constitutional Rights of Children
The progress of a state may be measured by the extent to which it
safeguards the rights of its children.37
Under the common law, children traditionally have been denied
many basic rights accorded adults. 38 During the past fifteen years,
however, the Supreme Court has reiterated that constitutional rights
are not solely the prerogative of those who have reached majority.39
For example, the Court has concluded that a minor has the right to
exercise freedom of speech,40 to enjoy equal protection against discrim-
ination because of race4' or illegitimacy, 42 to gain access to contracep-
tives, 43 to secure an abortion, 44 and to obtain procedural due process
protections in both criminal45 and civil46 contexts.47
In examining children's rights over the past two decades, the
courts frequently have confronted issues surrounding the constitution-
37. I G. ABBOTT, THE CHILD AND THE STATE, at vii (1938).
38. Bricker, Children's Rights.- A Movement in Search of Meaning, 13 U. RICH. L. REV.
661, 663 (1979). For example, minors do not have the right to vote in federal elections or to
hold national office. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3; art. 2, § 1; amend. XXVI. It was once
believed that "[tihe basic right of a juvenile is not to liberty but to custody." Shears, Legal
Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A. J. 719, 720 (1962) (cited in In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967)).
39. Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their
Application, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 153 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Teitelbaum & Ellis]. See In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74 (1976): "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one reaches the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected
by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." (Citations omitted.) See also Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (quoting Gault and Danforth). The com-
mentary in recent years has been extensive. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 20; Geiser, The
Rights of Children, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1027 (1977); Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework/or
Analysis, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 255 (1979); Symposium, Children and the Law, 39 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 1 (1975); Symposium, Children and the Law, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 655 (1979).
40. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969).
41. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
42. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); cf. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978) (New York statute allowing illegitimate child to inherit from father only if court of
competent jurisdiction has entered order declaring paternity during the father's lifetime not
violative of equal protection clause).
43. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
44. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
45. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, and
cross-examination, and not to incriminate oneself); cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971) (juveniles have no right to jury trials).
46. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
47. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 n.14 (1977); Garvey, supra note
20, at 769.
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ality of school discipline.48 Certain students' rights have been accorded
constitutional protection. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District,4 9 the Court concluded that students have a limited
right of free speech in school, and in Goss v. Lopez,50 the Court held
that a schoolchild must be provided with a hearing before or shortly
after being suspended. Justice White, writing for the majority in Goss,
determined that public school students have constitutionally recogniza-
ble property and liberty interests in their education and concluded that
those interests may be protected by the due process clause.51 By assert-
ing that students retain their rights while at school, Tinker and Goss
established that there are constitutional limits to the state school offi-
cial's authority to administer discipline.52
48. Veidemanis, Undue Process in Punishing Children, 8 HUM. RIGHTS 33 (1979).
49. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, two public high school students and one junior
high school student wore black armbands to their schools in Des Moines, Iowa, "to publicize
their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce." Id. at 504. The
armbands were part of a plan conceived by a group of both students and adults, including at
least one of the petitioners' parents. Aware of the plan, the Des Moines school authorities
adopted a policy that any pupil who wore an armband to school would be asked to remove
it. The policy further provided that students who refused would be suspended until they
returned without armbands. Three students were subsequently suspended. The petitioners,
through their fathers, filed a complaint in federal court seeking to restrain the school author-
ities from disciplining them and asking for nominal damages. The district court upheld the
school's actions, and an equally divided Eighth Circuit, considering the case en banc, af-
firmed without opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the wearing of
armbands in the circumstances of the case was "entirely divorced from actually or poten-
tially disruptive conduct," and was in fact "akin to 'pure speech'" and thus "entitled to
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment." Id. at 505-06. The school regula-
tion, therefore, violated the students' first amendment rights, because there was no evidence
that the authorities had reason to believe that the wearing of the armbands would "materi-
ally and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school," id. at 513, or "impinge
upon the rights of other students," id. at 509.
50. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In Goss, Columbus, Ohio public high school students brought
a class action alleging that they had been suspended for up to 10 days without a hearing. An
Ohio statute empowered the principal of a public school to discipline students by suspending
them for up to 10 days or expelling them; the student's parents had to be notified and given
reasons for the action within 24 hours. The students' complaint sought a declaration that the
statute was unconstitutional in that it allowed "school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of
their rights to an education without a hearing of any kind," in violation of the fourteenth
amendment's procedural due process clause. Id. at 568. The complaint also sought to ex-
punge past suspension reports from student records and to enjoin future suspension pursu-
ant to the statute.
A three-judge federal court concluded that the suspensions violated the due process
clause and granted the injunction regarding the students' records. Affirming on direct ap-
peal, the Supreme Court held that the statute violated the due process clause in failing to
provide notice or a hearing, either before or shortly after the suspension, and that the sus-
pensions were therefore invalid.
51. Note, ConstitutionalLaw-The Children's Crusadefor ConstitutionalRecognition, 78
W. VA. L. REv. 192, 193 (1975); see Goss, 419 U.S. at 573-76.
52. See Veidemanis, Undue Process in Punishing Children, 8 HUM. RGHTS 33 (1979).
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Lower courts have recognized additional liberty interests of public
school students. They have restricted the authority of schools to pro-
hibit the wearing of long hair,53 to enforce dress codes, 54 to restrain the
publication of student newspapers, 55 and to ban books from school li-
braries.5 6 Lower courts also have placed limits on the public school's
ability to exclude unwed parents from classes57 and to exclude married
pupils from school activities. 58 No court, however, has yet examined
whether a child's due process right to be free from severe physical pun-
ishment is identical to that possessed by an adult. 59
Although it is doubtful whether the law now would condone any
degree of corporal punishment for an adult, 60 parents, school officials,
and teachers are all privileged to administer corporal punishment to
However, the right to education may not be fundamental under the United States Constitu-
tion. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300 (M.D.N.C.), aft'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975),
citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973), in which the Court
refused, in the context of an equal protection case, to mark education as a fundamental
interest.
In addition, it does not appear that lower courts have interpreted Tinker expansively.
See, e.g., Tate v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972) (suspension of students pursu-
ant to regulation prohibiting creation of disturbance upheld; students had quietly left school
rally to protest playing of "Dixie"); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971) (suspension of students for wearing antiwar buttons upheld
where school rule against wearing buttons had been in effect for a long time and its abroga-
tion would be disruptive of racial harmony at school).
53. See, e.g., Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972). But see New Rider v.
Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1974) (indefinite
suspension of minor male Pawnee Indians who wore hair in long braids in violation of
school hair-length regulation upheld); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972) (refus-
ing to recognize a constitutional right to wear long hair in a public school). See generally
School Dirciline, supra note 7, at 535-37 (regulation of student appearance).
54. See, e.g., Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
55. See, e.g., Niteberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Fujishima v. Board of
Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); caf. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (upholding seizure of school newspaper because officials believed distribution would
embarrass the student government vice-president and lead to disruption).
56. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976);
cf. Presidents Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 998 (1972) (school authorities have discretion to remove books from library shelves).
57. See, e.g., Shull v. Columbus Mun. Separate School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D.
Miss. 1972). See generally School Discipline, supra note 7, at 537-38 (regulation of student
marriages and pregnancy). For a general discussion of the courts' case-by-case approach to
the extension of constitutional rights to children, see Geiser, The Rights of Children, 28 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1027 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Beeson v. Kiowa County School Dist., 567 P.2d 801 (Colo. App. 1977).
59. The Hall and Baker courts analyzed the issue briefly. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d
607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 301-02 (M.D.N.C.), aI'd, 423
U.S. 907 (1975). The Court in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), discussing an
eighth amendment claim, focused on the distinction between criminals and noncriminals
rather than between children and adults.
60. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 301 (M.D.N.C.), affd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
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children.61 Despite their common constitutional sources, it is generally
acknowledged that the rights and liberty interests of children and
adults are not identical. In a number of cases, the protections afforded
children differ markedly from those guaranteed adults.62
Three principal reasons have been advanced to justify denying a
child the constitutional protection that an adult would receive under
similar circumstances. 63 First, a child may be considered to possess an
inferior ability to make mature, responsible decisions in certain areas.64
Second, the Supreme Court has identified "the peculiar vulnerability of
children" as a reason for concluding that children's and adults' rights
cannot be equated.65 Third, the state may have other valid interests in
limiting a child's right that would not be applicable to an adult.66
States have claimed, for example, to have substantial interest in the
raising and educating of their youth.67 Important state interests in sup-
porting the family unit and parental decisionmaking have also been
61. Garvey, supra note 20, at 781-82. See notes 11-17 & accompanying text su ra, note
215 & text accompanying notes 212-18 infra. As the Supreme Court of Indiana observed
over a century ago: "It can hardly be doubted but that public opinion will, in time, strike the
ferule from the hands of the teacher, leaving him as the true basis of government, only the
resources of his intellect and heart .... The husband can no longer moderately chastise
his wife; nor.., the master his servant or apprentice. Even the degrading cruelties of the
naval service have been arrested. Why the person of the school-boy, 'with his shining morn-
ing face,' should be less sacred in the eye of the law than that of the apprentice or the sailor,
is not easily explained." Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290, 292-93 (1853).
62. Monsees, The Sometimes-Persor" LegalAutonomy and the Child, 6 OHIO N.U.L.
REv. 570, 571 (1979); Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 39, at 159. For example, states may
limit the religious activities of minors when some danger is present, although they probably
could not control adults in such ways. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944). States usually require school attendance by children under a certain age, see, e.g.,
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 1978), and may limit their access to sexually explicit mate-
rial that could not be kept from adults, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See
Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 39, at 159; see also Garvey, supra note 20, at 773-74 & n.26:
"[The fundamental interests strand of contemporary equal protection analysis has never
required parity of treatment between children and adults."
63. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
64. See id. at 634, 635-37 (considering a minor's right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy).
65. Id. at 634.
66. Developments in the Lan-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156,
1358 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; see Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 692 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); see generally Garvey, supra note 20, at 776;
Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 39, at 153, 165. The legal status of children is a product of
overlapping spheres of authority. Parents' rights, states' rights, and children's rights all vie
for ascendancy. See Monsees, The Sometimes-Person" Legal Autonomy and the Child, 6
OHIO N.U.L. REv. 570, 573 (1979).
67. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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asserted.68 Although the Supreme Court has been hesitant to define
"the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state," 69 it now
seems accurate to conclude that "in most cases children have the same
liberty interests as adults, but that the occasions for legitimate state re-
striction of the exercise of those liberties are more frequent. '70
Because it is assumed that children need to be taught proper be-
havior, many people believe that it is acceptable to control a child's
freedom to act, even if the child has not misbehaved. 71 Moderate phys-
ical punishment of public school students may be constitutionally
proper. In light of the current disapproval of corporal punishment of
adults, 72 however, and the recognition by the Supreme Court of chil-
dren's rights in other areas, 73 it appears that a child has "a legitimate
interest in avoiding unnecessary or arbitrary" corporal punishment.74
The Supreme Court has placed its determination that "corporal pun-
ishment in public schools implicates a constitutionally protected liberty
interest ' 75 among those areas in which "the child's right is virtually co-
extensive with that of an adult. ' 76 Therefore, absent any overriding
state interest in corporal punishment, the constitutional right to be free
from severe physical punishment should be equally applicable to chil-
dren and adults.
Challenges to Corporal Punishment in the Public School
For almost 150 years,77 American courts have heard challenges to
public school corporal punishment based on alleged violations of crim-
inal law,78 tort law, 79 state statutes,80 and constitutional guarantees. 8 '
68. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634, 637-39 (1979); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
69. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
70. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 39, at 158; see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635
("[O]ur cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its
legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern,. . . sympa-
thy, and . . . paternal attention.' ") (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550
(1971)).
71. Garvey, supra note 20, at 776.
72. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
73. See notes 39, 49, 50, 52 & text accompanying notes 39-57 supra.
74. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 302 (M.D.N.C.), a]7'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
75. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 641, 672 (1977).
76. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
77. The first reported case addressing corporal punishment was Commonwealth v. Fell,
I1 Haz. Reg. 179 (Pa. Com. P1. 1833), cited in Comment, Corporal Punishment in the Public
Schools.: The Legal Questions, 7 AKRON L. REV. 457, 457 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Legal
Questions].
78. See, e.g., People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. Supp. 771, 300 P. 801 (1931); People v.
Ball, 58 Ill. 2d 36, 317 N.E.2d 54 (1974); People v. Mummert, 183 Misc. 243, 50 N.Y.S.2d 699
(1944); Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 396 (1963 & Supps. 1979 & 1981). See note 80 infra. For a
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Generally, the courts have confronted issues surrounding corporal pun-
ishment in the schools in three contexts:82 civil suits seeking damages
for injuries resulting from the imposition of physical force on a school-
child;83 state-initiated criminal actions against school officials for as-
sault and battery on a pupil;8 4 and cases involving the discharge of a
teacher for the misuse of corporal punishment.85 These challenges to
the use of corporal punishment usually have failed.
Judicial recognition of the constitutional rights of public school
students has generated new constitutional attacks during the last dec-
ade, most of which have also been rejected.8 6 The first case to present a
constitutional challenge to corporal punishment was Murphy v. Kerd-
gan.87 Parent plaintiffs argued that the use of physical force to disci-
pline Boston schoolchildren constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment, a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment, and a
violation of fourteenth amendment procedural due process.88 Pursuant
to a consent decree, the school system agreed to ban corporal punish-
ment as long as the present school committee remained in office. 89
Later constitutional challenges to the practice of corporal punish-
discussion of the inadequacy of nonconstitutional remedies, see notes 215, 221 & text accom-
panying notes 211-25 infra.
79. See, e.g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954); LaFrentz v. Gallagher,
105 Ariz. 255, 462 P.2d 804 (1969); Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377
(1944); Drake v. Thomas, 310 1. App. 57,33 N.E.2d 889 (1941); Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind.
290 (1853). See generally Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 723, 734-38
(1959); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 469 (1955 & Supps. 1980 & 1981) (teacher's civil liability for
administering corporal punishment to pupils).
80. School personiiel are sometimes prosecuted under criminal statutes prohibiting
child abuse. See, e.g., People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. Supp. 771, 300 P. 801 (1931) (prose-
cution under CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a). Others are prosecuted under assault and battery
statutes. See, e.g., Serres v. South Santa Anita School Bd., 10 Cal. App. 2d 152, 51 P.2d 893
(1935); People v. Ball, 58 IM. 2d 36, 317 N.E.2d 54 (1974); People v. Mummert, 183 Misc.
243, 50 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1944).
81. Legal Questions, supra note 77, at 457; see, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977).
82. Legal Questions, supra note 77, at 458.
83. See note 79 supra.
84. See notes 78 & 80 supra.
85. Legal Questions, supra note 77, at 458; see, e.g., Berry v. Arnold School Dist., 199
Ark. 1118, 137 S.W.2d 256 (1940); Indiana State Personnel Bd. v. Jackson, 244 Ind. 321, 192
N.E.2d 740 (1963).
86. Legal Questions, supra note 77, at 460; Note, CorporalPunishment in Public Schools:
Constitutional Challenge After Ingraham v. Wright?, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1449, 1450 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Challenge After Ingraham].
87. No. 69-1174-W (D. Mass. filed November 6, 1969), cited in Note, Corporal Punish-
ment in the Public Schools: Murphy v. Kerrigan, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 583, 583 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Murphy v. Kerrigan].
88. Note, Murphy v. Kerrigan, supra note 87, at 583.
89. Id.
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ment were premised on the theory that corporal punishment by school
authorities infringed upon the right of parents to raise and discipline
their children without state interference.90 The courts, using a rational
basis test,91 upheld the use of at least moderate corporal punishment
despite these claims. Balancing the parents' right to control their
child's discipline against the state's interest in maintaining order in the
schools, these courts concluded that corporal punishment was ration-
ally related to the state's legitimate interest.92 In 1975, the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed a district court holding in Baker v. Owen93
that "parental approval of corporal punishment is not Constitutionally
required." 94 It therefore appears that any due process protection af-
forded students must rest in those rights that are independent of the
interests of the parents or the family.95
In Ingraham v. Wright,96 the Supreme Court addressed the rights
of students in the context of public school corporal punishment. Pupils
in a Florida junior high school sought damages and injunctive relief,
90. See, e.g., Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), afid, 423 U.S. 907 (1975);
Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1974), aft d, 536 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 903 (1977); Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Forty
Whacks, supra note 12, at 870.
91. See notes 124-25 & text accompanying notes 124-26 infra.
92. See Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D. Vt. 1973); Ware v. Estes, 328 F.
Supp. 657, 660 (N.D. Tex. 1971), afdper curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1027 (1972); cf. Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (school district
could not enforce its rules on corporal punishment against children whose parents had noti-
fied the appropriate authorities that such disciplinary method was prohibited); Challenge
After Ingraham, supra note 86, at 1455.
93. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), afl'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
94. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 n.22 (1977). The district court in Baker had
refused to view parental rights as fundamental, stating that previous decisions according
parents rights do not "enshrine parental values so high in the hierarchy of constitutional
values." 395 F. Supp. at 299. The court reasoned that parental rights had been protected in
other areas because of their venerability and because the states' actions in these cases had
been arbitrary and capricious. By contrast, the parental opposition to corporal punishment
enjoyed "no such universal approbation," id. at 300, and therefore did not merit deference
when weighed against a legitimate state interest. See Challenge After Ingraham, supra note
86, at 1455.
95. Garvey, supra note 20, at 779 n.57. This conclusion is supported by the decisions in
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979), which indicate that the child has rights that may limit state interference
even when it is exercised in support of parental choices. But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584 (1979) (parents retain plenary authority to seek institutional mental health care for their
children, subject to independent medical judgment).
Baker, however, concerned only nonsevere corporal punishment. One commentator
has suggested that the question whether parental approval of severe corporal punishment is
required under substantive due process may still be unresolved. See Rosenberg, Ingraham v.
Wright." The Supreme Court's Whioping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 75, 102 n. 152 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Rosenberg].
96. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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alleging that school officials had violated their constitutional rights by
subjecting them to disciplinary corporal punishment. The plaintiffs ini-
tially based their claims on three grounds: first, corporal punishment of
schoolchildren amounts to cruel and unusual punishment; second, se-
vere corporal punishment of public school students violates fourteenth
amendment substantive due process because it is "arbitrary, capricious
and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational goal"; and third,
the school system's policies for corporal punishment violate fourteenth
amendment due process standards by failing to provide the pupils with
any procedural safeguards before administering punishment. 97
Although the Court acknowledged that the punishment com-
plained of in Ingraham was "exceptionally harsh,198 it denied or
avoided the various constitutional claims. In a 5-4 decision written by
Justice Powell, 99 the Court decided that the eighth amendment was
designed to protect persons convicted of crimes and did not apply to
the paddling of schoolchildren.100 All members of the Court agreed
that the student had a fourteenth amendment liberty interest when he
or she was deliberately punished by restraint and the infliction of "ap-
97. 525 F.2d 909, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), aj7'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). The
Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari on the substantive due process question. See
note 105 & text accompanying notes 103-05 infra.
98. 430 U.S. at 657. The testimony before the district court revealed the experiences of
students at the junior high school. For example, on one occasion a teacher asked some
students, including James Ingraham, to leave the stage of the school auditorium. The stu-
dents left, but were slow in doing so. Taken to the office to be paddled, James protested his
innocence and refused to be hit. Aided by two other school officials who held James, the
principal hit him at least twenty times with a wooden paddle. The punishment produced a
hematoma on the buttocks; a doctor who examined James advised him to stay home from
school for at least one week.
Roosevelt Andrews, the other named plaintiff in the case, stated that one year he was
paddled about ten times, often for being late for physical education class or for wearing an
improper gym uniform. On one occasion, paddling by the principal caused a severe swelling
of his wrist and he was unable to use his arm for a week.
Another student's hand was fractured and apparently disfigured as a result of a pad-
dling. Yet another pupil accused of making an obscene telephone call to a teacher was
paddled approximately fifty times; a different child later confessed to the offense. Two boys
were struck about fifty times each for "playing hooky." One boy who had asthma and heart
trouble was hit on the back and head with a paddle because he wanted to clean his chair in
the auditorium before sitting down. The child had to have an operation to remove a lump
that developed where he had been struck. On two other occasions this same child vomited
blood after being paddled. Many students testified that they had been subjected to pad-
dlings for a variety of offenses, including chewing gum and not keeping their shirttails tuck-
ed in, and also testified that administrators carried paddles and brass knuckles around the
school. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 255-59 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on rehearing, 525
F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
99. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Blackmun and Rehnquist. The dissenting opinion by Justice White was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Justice Stevens also wrote a brief dissenting opinion.
100. 430 U.S. at 664.
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preciable physical pain" by school officials acting under color of state
law.101 The majority held, however, that the availability of common
law restraints and remedies adequately satisfied the requirements of
procedural due process.102
The Ingraham Court denied certiorari on the substantive due pro-
cess question,10 3 which was posed broadly: "Is the infliction of severe
corporal punishment upon public school students arbitrary, capricious
and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational purpose and
therefore violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?" 1 4 Ingraham thus left unanswered "the substantive due
process issue of the child's own right to physical integrity."'105
Substantive Due Process
The Constitution prohibits the federal government and the states
from depriving a person of "life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law."'1 6 The due process clauses traditionally have been held to
provide a foundation for analyzing the adequacy of government proce-
dures. 107 In addition, apart from the procedural limitations inhering in
the concept of due process, 10 8 the clauses have been construed to pro-
vide "substantive constitutional protection of liberty and property."' 109
This due process limit on the substance of government regulation has
come to be known as the doctrine of substantive due process. 0
Levels of Scrutiny
The Supreme Court initially refused to recognize any due process
limit on the substance of legislation."' By the end of the nineteenth
101. Id. at 674.
102. Id. at 672, 683. For an excellent commentary on Ingraham, see Rosenberg, supra
note 95, at 75.
103. 430 U.S. at 659 n.12, 679 n.47.
104. Id. at 659 n.12.
105. Rosenberg, supra note 95, at 107. Professor Rosenberg stated that "a principled
resolution thereof. . . would have required a finding that severe corporal punishment is
unconstitutional." Id. at 100.
106. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
107. Developments, supra note 66, at 1166; see, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 546-
54 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the result); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
108. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 420 (5th ed.
1980).
109. Developments, supra note 66 at 1166; see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 542 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 122
(1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting); E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948). See
text accompanying notes 112-28 infra.
110. Developments, supra note 66, at 1166.
111. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 433-34 (5th ed.
1980); see, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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century, however, the Court had concluded that the due process clauses
could be used to place some restrictions on government's regulatory
power, particularly in the economic arena."12 Lochner v. New York I13
was typical' 14 of the Court's approach to economic regulation in the
first third of the twentieth century. In evaluating the constitutionality
of a statute prohibiting the employment of bakers for more than sixty
hours a week, the Court asked: "Is this a fair, reasonable and appropri-
ate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable,
unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual
to his personal liberty. . . ?,,115 Using this standard, the Court struck
down as completely arbitrary any legislation it found to be unwise or
unnecessary, substituting its judgment for that of federal or state legis-
lative bodies.'I 6
During the Depression, the Court began to move away from its
reliance on substantive due process to protect economic rights. 17 In
upholding state regulation of women's wages, Chief Justice Hughes
concluded that the legislature is entitled to its judgment", even if a
statute's wisdom is "debatable" and its effects "uncertain."' '19 By 1938,
the Court had determined that regulatory legislation would be upheld
unless "facts made known or generally assumed. . . preclude the as-
sumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
112. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). For a discussion of economic regu-
lation by the Supreme Court, see Reznick, The Constitutionality ofBusiness Regulation in the
Burger Court: Revival and Restraint, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1981).
113. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
114. Developments, sufpra note 66, at 1167; see, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525 (1923) (wage regulation violates due process); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
("yellow dog" contracts may not be prohibited); see also L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 7-3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. For a brief history of substantive due
process, see Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689, 695-704 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Perry].
115. 198 U.S. at 56.
116. Ferguson v. Skrupka, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); see Developments, supra note 66, at
1167. As Professor Lupu states: "[F]rom its genesis in the Slaughter-House Cases dissents
through its flowering in Lochner v. New York, substantive due process doctrine first
threatened and then worked a reign of terror on attempted regulation of wages, hours of
labor, and unionization ... .This judicial infusion of values of economic freedom into the
due process clauses dominated the constitutional law of the first third of the twentieth cen-
tury." Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. Rv. 981,
986 (1979) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Lupu].
117. The Lochner era is generally recognized as ending with West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Childrens Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); seeDevelopments, supra note 66, at 1167 n.53. Professor Lupu states: "The Court, by 1937, had
exhausted its interventionist capital, and had thoroughly discredited itself as a sensitive and
responsible institution of government." Lupu, supra note 116, at 989.
118. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 399.
119. Id.
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and experience of the legislators."1 20
Although most economic regulation was thus placed beyond the
scope of judicial review, in dicta the Court continued to recognize the
due process clauses as prohibiting completely arbitrary governmental
deprivations of economic rights.' 21 The Court also continued to re-
quire more than a minimal justification for the abridgment of certain
protections, particularly first amendment guarantees, found in the Bill
of Rights. 122 These constitutional guarantees were made applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 123
Under present law, the determination of whether a state may con-
stitutionally infringe upon an individual's rights usually depends on
whether the right is deemed fundamental. The Supreme Court consist-
ently has held that the abridgment of most personal rights not given
explicit constitutional recognition is permissible unless the government
is unable to demonstrate a rational basis for its regulation. 124 An indi-
vidual who challenges state infringement of such a right must demon-
strate that the challenged legislation has no possible public purpose, or
that there is no rational relation between this purpose and the legisla-
tion's means of achieving it. 125 It is difficult to make this showing. 126
The Supreme Court has determined that certain liberties are "fun-
damental." State infringement of "fundamental rights" is permitted
only if the state can show "a 'compelling state interest' and that legisla-
tive enactments [are] narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake."' 127 Outcomes of constitutional challenges to
state actions are largely determined by whether or not a right is desig-
nated "fundamental," because the review standard for fundamental
liberties is exacting, while the test for nonfundamental liberties is ex-
120. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (footnote omitted); see
Developments, supra note 66, at 1167.
121. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); see also Perry, supra note 114, at
704 & n.76 (economic regulation must plausibly serve the public welfare).
122. Developments, supra note 66, at 1167; see, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947) (nonestablishment of religion); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (freedom to
petition).
123. Developments, supra note 66, at 1167. See note 154 & text accompanying notes 130,
154 infra. See generally TRIBE, supra note 114, § 11-2 (discussing the Court's selective incor-
poration of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment).
124. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1030. The liberty of contract is such a nonfundamental
right. Id.
125. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (upholding a police depart-
ment regulation of officers' hair styles as not "so irrational that it may be branded
'arbitrary' ").
126. See Henkin, Privacy andAutonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1426 (1974).
127. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted); see Lupu, supra note
116, at 1030.
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tremely deferential to state legislative power. 128
Fundamental Rights
There are three primary sources for "fundamental" liberties under
substantive due process.129 The main source of these liberties is the Bill
of Rights, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause.130 The "constitutional structure" and the concerns
embodied within that framework are a second source of fundamental
liberties.13' The third source is found in what Professor Lupu calls "a
'non-source': naked judicial judgment that a liberty is of special consti-
tutional magnitude, despite a lack of persuasive linkage with structural
or textually identified values."132
In the past twenty years, the basis on which rights are designated
fundamental has become a major source of controversy.133  Courts,
scholars, and politicians making judicial appointments have all de-
bated the proper role of the text of the Constitution in limiting judicial
review.' 34 This debate, and indeed the very legitimacy of substantive
due process, is brought into focus by two schools of constitutional
thought: the "interpretivist" and the "noninterpretivist."
The interpretivist 35 position, voiced by Professor John Ely, con-
tends that the Court is "under an obligation to trace its premises to the
charter from which it derives its authority."' 36 In his view, "a neutral
128. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1030; see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
548-49 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Bur-
ger, CJ., dissenting).
129. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1030.
130. Id. at 1031. See note 154 & accompanying text nfira.
13 1. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1031. The governmental structures mandated by the Con-
stitution and its design recently have been viewed as a repository of substantive rights. For
example, decisionmaking power is divided between the states and federal government, and
among the branches of the federal government, in such a way that each checks the power of
the others. Furthermore, certain individual rights and choices, such as free speech, are
placed totally beyond government authority. For a discussion of structural due process, see
C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); TRIBE, supra
note 114, § 17-1 to -3; Perry, supra note 114, at 693.
132. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1032; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of
pregnant woman to decide whether or not to bear child); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (right of married couples to buy contraceptives). For a discussion of rights that
have been protected, see notes 151, 153-54, 159, 182 & text accompanying notes 151-82 infra.
133. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 55 (1962).
134. Perry, supra note 114, at 709; see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
542-44 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
135. Developments, supra note 66, at 1168. For a concise description of the interpretivist
view and its adherents, see id. at 1169-73; see also Perry, supra note 114, at 709-13 (discuss-
ing the view that the values of the framers embodied in the constitutional text are the only
legitimate source of constitutional values).
136. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949
(1973).
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and durable principle may be a thing of beauty and a joy forever. But
if it lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as special,
it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business impos-
ing it." 137 Professor Ely is willing to go beyond the "documentary lan-
guage" and "discoverable intentions" of the framers when determining
the substantive content of some provisions of the Constitution; how-
ever, he, like other interpretivists, is unwilling to infuse the two due
process clauses with any such meaning. 138
Although the Court has at times resorted to theories of natural
law 139 or "ordered liberty"'140 to find rights not expressly within the
Constitution, interpretivists argue that the frequent application of these
theories would render the Court a "perpetual censor upon all legisla-
tion of the states."'' 41 Interpretivist courts142 and commentators dislike
removing legislative freedom and flexibility from the states and partic-
ularly fear that legitimate state legislation will fall prey to judicial sub-
jectivity. 43 As Justice Douglas wrote in 1963, the year the Court
formally disavowed Lochner:
Due process . . . is the wild card that can be put to such use as the
judges choose. Those who use it as the wild card often deny doing
so, saying that Due Process is not subjective, that it has its roots in
civilized ideas of ordered liberty. Yet no matter what the judges say,
Due Process, as it is presently employed, is fickle and capricious.44
The interpretivist position has never gained favor with a majority
of the Supreme Court or the academic community. Justices and com-
mentators have stated that "the Court should give content to the Con-
stitution's open-ended provisions by identifying and enforcing upon
the political branches America's fundamental values." 145 This position
has been articulated on the Court by Justices Cardozo, 46 Frank-
137. Id.
138. Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term-Forword: On Discovering Fundamental Val-
ues, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 5 n.3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ely].
139. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
140. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
141. Lupu, supra note 116, at 991 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 78 (1873)).
142. Justice Black adhered to the view that the Bill of Rights was the measure of the
liberties incorporated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
143. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
144. Douglas, The Bill ofRights Is Not Enough, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 219 (1963).
145. Ely, supra note 138, at 15. Professor Ely, of course, disagrees with this approach.
See id. at 32-33 (critical summary of this position); accord Beaird, In Their Own Image: The
Reframing ofthe Due Process Clause by the United States Supreme Court, 13 GA. L. REV.
479, 502-03 (although changing circumstances will necessitate change in content of constitu-
tional principles, Court will maintain authority "only by linking its decisions to the enduring
principles which the Constitution embodies") (1979).
146. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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furter,147 Harlan, 148 White' 49 and Powell.150 They have advocated that
rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' 51 "funda-
mentally fair,"' 152 or "fundamental to the American scheme of jus-
tice" 53 should be encompassed in the words "due process." The
Supreme Court often has relied on the Bill of Rights for guidance in
determining which guarantees are embraced within the due process
clause. Consequently, most of the rights guaranteed by the first eight
amendments have been selectively incorporated and provided due pro-
cess protection through the fourteenth amendment.' 54
As Justice Harlan noted in dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 55 however:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion, the right to keep
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speak-
ing, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also recognizes . . . that
certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state
147. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
148. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-83 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-45 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
149. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
502 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
150. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 546-54 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the
result); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
151. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.). A right that is "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is "basic to a free society," Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), or one of the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions," Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67
(1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). The right to counsel in a
criminal trial has long been held to be such a right. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
152. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 186 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 149. Research into American social and political history leads to the
conclusion that such a right is essential to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 1d. at 157-58.
154. Id. at 148. Professor Tribe therefore concludes that the due process clause protects
"the right to just compensation; the first amendment freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
petition, free exercise of religion, and non-establishment of religion; the fourth amendment
rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure and to exclude from criminal trials
evidence illegally seized; the fifth amendment rights to be free of compelled self-incrimina-
tion and double jeopardy; the sixth amendment rights to counsel, to a speedy and public
trial before a jury, to an opportunity to confront opposing witnesses, and to compulsory
process for the purpose of obtaining favorable witnesses; and the eighth amendment right to
be free of cruel and unusual punishments." TRIBF, supra note 114, at 567-68 (footnotes
omitted).
155. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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needs asserted to justify their abridgment.156
To determine the constitutionality of a state law or action infringing a
claimed right, Justice Harlan weighed the right and the extent of its
abridgment against the asserted state interest; while lesser rights re-
ceived no protection in the face of a rational reason for state interfer-
ence, fundamental rights could be burdened substantially if the state
could assert a compelling interest and no less restrictive means of serv-
ing this interest. 157 Although Justice Harlan's concern for the substan-
tive guarantees of due process has gained some current favor, 158 the
imprecise nature of his balancing approach still makes it difficult to
discern whether a given right deserves constitutional protection.
Family Rights
Most of the cases in which courts have found unenumerated fun-
damental rights concern actual or potential family relationships.159
The constitutional recognition of these "family" or "privacy" rights is
usually traced to Meyer v. Nebraska,160 which protected the right to
have one's child taught a foreign language, and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters,16 1 which upheld the right to send one's child to a private school.
These cases were decided during the Lochner era, when a number of
Supreme Court cases held that the due process clause provided sub-
156. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
157. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 671-76 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Developments, supra note 66, at 1194-95 & nn.249-50; see also Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result): "[The court must consider] the
nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of
the connection between legislative means and purpose, the existence of alternative means for
effectuating the purpose and the degree of confidence we have that the statute reflects the
legislative concern for the purpose that would legitimately support the means chosen."
158. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Ely,
supra note 138, at 10; Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159 (willingness of Burger Court to use substantive due process
review); Lupu, supra note 116, at 997-1003.
159. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1032; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973);
see also Heyman & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees- Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53
B.U.L. Rnv. 765, 769, 772-76 (1973) (cases from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), to
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), establish a "realm of private decision as to matters
of marriage, procreation and childrearing"). But see Epstein, Substantive Due Process by
Any Other Name. The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159, 170 (only common thread
running through cases is the "principle of classic liberalism: the state is entitled to restrict
the liberty of any individual within its jurisdiction only where necessary to protect other
persons from harm"); Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1639 (1979)
(stating that these cases are "a rag-tag lot" whose primary concern is not the family, and that
they do not clearly "add up to anything at all"). The Court has made it clear that the right
belongs to the individual and not to the family as a unit. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
160. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See text accompanying note 163 infra.
161. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See text accompanying note 163 infra.
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stantive protection for many rights, particularly economic ones, that no
longer receive such protection.' 62 Meyer and Pierce, however, have
been relied upon in recent decisions holding that there is a protected
interest in family autonomy. 163
Griswold v. Connecticut, 14 deemed by one commentator to be the
most important modem substantive due process decision,165 is among
the decisions protecting family autonomy. In Griswold, the Court
struck down a Connecticut statute that made it illegal for a married
couple to use birth control. Explaining that "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guar-
antees that help give them life and substance,"' 66 and relying on the
"zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees," 67 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found marital pri-
vacy to be within this protected zone. Justice Goldberg, concurring in
an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, agreed
that the case was resolved by the unmentioned right to privacy.' 68 Jus-
tice Goldberg stated that the language and history of the ninth amend-
ment 69 "shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental
rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amend-
ments and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed
exhaustive."' 70 The ninth amendment thus supported the theory that
the due process clauses provide a basis both for the recognition of these
rights and for increased scrutiny in the event of their abridgment.' 71
The family rights cases have been decided on a variety of
162. Developments, supra note 66, at 1162. See notes 116-17 & text accompanying notes
113-20 supra.
163. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
164. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
165. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 11-3, at 570.
166. 381 U.S. at 484.
167. Id. at 485.
168. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 11-3, at 571.
169. U.S. CONST. amend. IX: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
170. 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see Developments, supra note 66, at 1173-74.
Justice Harlan, who concurred separately in the judgment, again set forth his view that the
due process clauses provide the appropriate basis for the recognition of fundamental values,
regardless of any "radiations" from the Bill of Rights. 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in'the judgment). See Developments, supra note 66, at 1174.
Justice White, also concurring, explicitly used substantive due process as the basis for
his conclusion. "In my view," he stated, "this ... law as applied to married couples de-
prives them of... liberty [without due process] guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
against arbitrary or capricious denials." 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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grounds.172 Recent decisions have extended constitutional protection
to activities relating to marriage,173 contraception,174 childbearing, 75
and childrearing,176 and to the right of extended families to live to-
gether. 77 The Court 78 and commentators 79 have acknowledged that
in a number of these cases, as in Griswold v. Connecticut,180 substantive
due process provides the "ultimate basis of protection."'181 Some of the
decisions recognizing unenumerated fundamental constitutional rights,
however, protect interests outside the context of family relationships. 8 2
The question remains whether the respect for individual liberty and
privacy underlying these cases should be extended to protect public
schoolchildren from severe physical abuse.
Corporal Punishment as a Violation
of Substantive Due Process
Claims against school officials alleging constitutional violations
are brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,183 a civil rights statute. Al-
though a number of recent cases, including Ingraham,18 4 emphasize the
adequacy of state tribunals for protecting individual rights, others
stress the importance of a federal forum. 8 5 Courts considering chal-
172. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
173. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
174. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
175. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
176. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
177. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
178. See, e.g., id. (plurality opinion).
179. Lupu, supra note 116, at 996-1003.
180. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See note 171 & text accompanying notes 164-71 supra.
181. Developments, supra note 66, at 1161-62. On the other hand, the Court has refused
to protect male homosexuals against enforcement of a state sodomy statute, Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Va. 1975), aff'dmem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), the
right to divorce against residency requirements, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), or the
right of unrelated individuals to live together in a given community, Belie Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
182. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (right of nondangerous
mental patient to live in freedom upheld); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (indi-
vidual's right to bodily integrity protected).
183. Alexander & Horton, Ingraham v. Wright.- A Primer for Cruel and Unusual Juris-
prudence, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1332 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Alexander & Horton];
see, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Section 1983 reads in pertinent part: "Every person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
184. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane), afdon other grounds, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
185. Compare Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,701
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lenges to corporal punishment in public schools have uniformly found
the threshold requirements for maintaining a section 1983 action
satisfied. 8 6
The protection of substantive due process has been used to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of both statutes and regulations authorizing
corporal punishment and of the discipline as administered in individ-
ual cases.' 87 Most plaintiffs have challenged only the provision permit-
ting corporal punishment. In these cases, the courts employed a
rational basis test and upheld the statute as reasonably related to the
state's legitimate educational goals.188 In four cases, however, the
plaintiffs challenged the punishment as applied. 8 9
In Ware v. Estes,190 a federal district court acknowledged that cor-
poral punishment had been abused by some of the approximately seven
thousand teachers in the school district.' 9 ' Despite these findings, the
(1976) (fourteenth amendment is not "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States") and Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
146 (1979) (false imprisonment does not become a violation of the fourteenth amendment
merely because the defendant is a state official) with Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42
(1972) (stressing the importance of a federal forum where civil rights violation is in issue)
and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-83 (1961) (same). As the Supreme Court declared in
Monroe, a § 1983 action against a Chicago police officer: "It is no answer that the State has
a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy [under § 1983] is supplemen-
tary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal
one is invoked." Id. at 183; see Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 612 (4th Cir. 1980): "It is of
course settled that relief under § 1983 does not depend upon the unavailability of state reme-
dies, but is supplementary to them." For a discussion of § 1983 and its relation to state
remedies, see Neuborne, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977); Developments in
the Law-Section 1983 andFederalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1264-74 (1977); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Public School Children's Right to Substantive Due Process and Federal
Relief Under Section 1983for Excessively Severe Corporal Punishment, 17 WAKE FOREST L.
Rnv. 72, 76-78 (1981).
186. Challenge After Ingraham, supra note 86, at 1452. These threshold requirements
are that the claim be based on an infringement of rights guaranteed by the federal govern-
ment by a person acting under color of state law, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 150 (1970), and that the claim be "substantial," see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536-38 (1974). Challenge After Ingraham, supra note 86, at 1452; see also Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (holding that school board members may be liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for invading a student's constitutional rights); Note, Constitutional La-Due
Process-Damages, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101, 104-05 (1979).
187. Challenge After Ingraham, supra note 86, at 1451.
188. Id. at 1458; see, e.g., Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), a ff'dper
curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
189. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980); Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909
(5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), ai'don other grounds, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Coffinan v. Kuehler,
409 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), a 'd
per curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972). For a discussion of
Ingraham, Coffman, and Ware, see ChallengeAfter Ingraham, supra note 86, at 1458-59.
190. 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), a 'dper curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
191. 328 F. Supp. at 658.
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Court held that it would scrutinize only the district's rules and policies
for constitutional violations. 192 The court found these provisions to be
constitutional, reasoning that the common law afforded adequate reme-
dies in cases in which the punishment was unreasonable or excessive. 193
In Ingraham v. Wright,194 the Fifth Circuit also refused to grant consti-
tutional review to each instance of punishment; as in Ware, the refusal
was based on the availability of common law remedies.195 In Coffman
v. Kuehler,196 another federal district court found that the "licks" to be
meted out before the plaintiff could return to school were not unreason-
able in light of his "continued misconduct."'' 97 Although the decisions
were thus based on different grounds, the substantive due process claim
was rejected in all three cases.
In Hall v. Tawney,198 however, the Fourth Circuit held that, while
disciplinary corporal punishment does not by itself violate a child's
substantive due process rights, 199 a cognizable claim may be stated
when it is "based upon an episodic application of force not authorized
by state law or policy." 2°° The court articulated this standard for deter-
mining a due process violation:
[T]he substantive due process inquiry in school corporal punishment
cases must be whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was
so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by
malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of
zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official
power literally shocking to the conscience. 20
192. Id. at 658.
193. Id. at 660.
194. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), affidon other grounds, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
For a discussion of Ingraham, see 97-99, 105 & text accompanying notes 96-105 supra.
195. "We think it a misuse of our judicial power to determine, for example, whether a
teacher has acted arbitrarily in paddling a particular child for certain behavior or whether in
a particular instance of misconduct five licks would have been a more appropriate punish-
ment than ten licks." 525 F.2d at 917; see Challenge After Ingraham, supra note 86, at 1459.
196. 409 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
197. Id. at 549.,
198. 521 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
199. Id. at 611.
200. Id. at 614.
201. Id. at 613. The court's standard was apparently adapted from the Second Circuit's
test for due process violations set forth in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Friendly, J.), a case in which a prisoner was beaten by prison officials. See Hall v. Tawney,
621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980); Comment, Constitutional Law-Public School Children's
Right to Substantive Due Process and Federal Relief Under Section 1983for Excessivey Se-
vere Corporal Punishment, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 72, 82-83 (1981). The Johnson sub-
stantive due process test considers the following factors: "[T]he need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of
injury inflicted, and whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the the very purpose of causing harm."
481 F.2d at 1033.
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In Hall, without apparent provocation a teacher struck a sixth
grade student with a paddle,20 2 violently shoved the child against a
large stationary desk, and then struck her repeatedly and violently. As
a result, the child was taken to a nearby hospital, where she remained
for ten days, suffering possibly permanent injuries.203 The court found
that these facts stated a claim under substantive due process.204
The Hall standard, although permitting a constitutional remedy
for severe corporal punishment by school authorities, appears to be too
strict a test for determining a constitutional violation. Any substantive
due process standard would undoubtedly demand that the punishment
be "severe" and "disproportionate to the need presented" to warrant
constitutional protection. By insisting that the disciplinary action be
inspired by malice, however, Hall resorted to a standard stricter than
that applied in most states in tort actions against teachers who physi-
cally abuse students.205 Because malice is difficult to prove, this re-
quirement may prevent meritorious claims from being successful.
After Hall, a clear and workable standard for determining a constitu-
tional violation has yet to be formulated by the courts.
A schoolchild may most successfully maintain a substantive due
process challenge to a claim of excessive corporal punishment if the
child's interest in his or her physical integrity is recognized as a funda-
mental right.20 6 Severe physical punishment would constitute an exces-
sive burden on a fundamental right. If a favorable fundamental right
determination is made, the state will have to demonstrate that it has a
compelling interest in maintaining order in the schools. Even if a com-
pelling interest is found, the child may prevail by showing that severe
physical discipline does not serve this legislative objective or that there
are less restrictive means for the state to reach this goal.
In analyzing the possibility of a successful substantive due process
challenge to corporal punishment, therefore, the nature of the child's
interest and the extent to which the interest is infringed should be ex-
amined.207 The level of scrutiny that should be applied and the state
202. The paddle was made of hard thick rubber and was about five inches in width. 621
F.2d at 614.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 614-15. Although Hall thus permitted a cause of action based on a substan-
tive due process violation, there was no adjudication on the merits. After remand to the
district court, the case was settled.
205. Many courts hold that the teacher or school official should be held liable if the
corporal punishment administered was excessive, even though he or she was acting in good
faith. See, e.g., Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944). But see Gordon
v. Oak Park School Dist., 24 I1L App. 3d 131, 320 N.E.2d 389, 392 (1974) (damages allowed
only if student can prove teacher acted with malice or willful and wanton behavior). See
note 215 & text accompanying notes 216-18 infra.
206. See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra.
207. Challenge After Ingraham, supra note 86, at 1470.
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interest in the practice of physical discipline should also be consid-
ered.20 8 As the adequacy of common law and statutory remedies has
often been held to bar due process claims, 20 9 the sufficiency of those
remedies must also be analyzed.210
The Adequacy of Nonconstitutional Remedies
The student's primary common law remedy for excessive or unrea-
sonable punishment lies in a tort action for assault and battery against
the disciplinarian.211 To be successful in such a claim the child must
overcome both the common law privilege of discipline2 12 and state-offi-
cial immunity.213 Furthermore, the potential claim is eliminated if the
child or the parent consents to the imposition of corporal
punishment.214
The traditional protective attitude some courts display towards
teachers is another reason a tort recovery is difficult to obtain.215 The
disciplinarian generally has the authority to inflict that degree of corpo-
ral punishment that is reasonable under the circumstances. 216 Al-
though most jurisdictions allow recovery for "unreasonable"
punishment,217 some courts allow damages only if the student can
prove that the teacher acted with malice or willful and wanton
208. Id.
209. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane), afd on other grounds,
430 U.S. 651 (1977); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), a}7'd per curiam, 458
F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
210. Challenge After Ingraham, supra note 86, at 1470.
211. See Forty Whacks, supra note 12, at 870. See note 79 supra for illustrative cases.
212. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 137; see Alexander & Horton, supra note 183, at 1330-
31.
213. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 975-76, 980; see Alexander & Horton, supra note 183, at
1330-31 (1979).
214. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 10. See Corporal Punishment, supra note 12, at 148.
215. Forty Whacks, supra note 12, at 875 n.72. Especially in the older cases, there is a
presumption that the teacher acted reasonably. See id. at 876. An Illinois appellate court
stated: "[T]he presumption is in favor of the correctness of the teacher's action in inflicting
corporal punishment upon the pupil. .. . For an error in judgment, although the punish-
ment is unnecessarily excessive, if it is not of a nature to cause lasting injury, and he acts in
good faith, the teacher is not liable." Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 64, 33 N.E.2d 889,
891 (1941), quoting 21 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 769. Other deci-
sions give the disciplinarian the benefit of any doubt that may exist as to reasonableness.
See, e.g., Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d
469, 477. Still other cases have declared that the teacher's judgment regarding reasonable-
ness must control as long as he or she inflicts no serious injury and acts without malice.
PROSSER, supra note 15, at 137. See, e.g., Tinkham v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110 N.W.2d 258
(1971); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 469 (1955 & Supps. 1980 & 1981) (general discussion of a
teacher's civil liability for administering corporal punishment to students).
216. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 137. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147, comments c-e, § 150 (1965).
217. See text accompanying note 202 supra.
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behavior.218
There are other reasons for concluding that a common law remedy
for corporal punishment is ineffective. In his dissenting opinion in In-
graham, Justice White determined that a tort action was "utterly inade-
quate to protect against at least the erroneous infliction of punishment
for two reasons. ' 219 First, under the challenged Florida law, "a student
could not recover damages from a teacher proceeding in good faith on
the reports and advice of others. ' 220 Second, Justice White noted that
the lawsuit to redress corporal punishment occurs only after the pun-
ishment has been imposed. As he explained, "The infliction of physical
pain is final and irreparable; it cannot be undone in a subsequent
proceeding. '221
When a teacher or school administrator has punished a student
excessively, the child may seek to recover damages in a tort action
against the disciplinarian and other responsible officials. In addition,
the teacher may be disciplined by the school system 222 or criminal
charges of assault and battery may be brought against him or her.223
Primarily because of various common law privileges and immuni-
ties,224 however, these remedies have proved inadequate. An action
brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 does not face these barriers and
therefore could be more effective in redressing the student's injury.
Moreover, the common law actions recommended by the Fifth
Circuit in Ingraham seek to remedy only the violation before the court.
Offering prospective as well as compensatory relief, the remedy for sub-
stantive due process violations would protect individuals from future
governmental interference with constitutionally protected interests as
well.2
25
The Nature of the Interest Affected
The unresolved question after Ingraham226 was whether a child in
218. Forty Whacks, supra note 12, at 876 n.72; see, e.g., Gordon v. Oak Park School
Dist., 24 111. App. 3d 131, 133, 320 N.E.2d 389, 392 (1974).
219. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 693 (White, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 693-95 (White, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 695 (White, J., dissenting). A schoolchild can also seek to have the discipli-
narian punished under the criminal law. The requirement that the teacher have acted with
malice, however, is more prevalent here. See, e.g., State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. &
B) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 416 (1937). There is some indication that criminal statutes are rarely
enforced against school officials. Alexander & Horton, supra note 183, at 1330. Further-
more, the public, rather than the child, is vindicated by a successful criminal prosecution.
Id.
222. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
223. See note 221 & text accompanying notes 78 & 221 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 212-14 supra.
225. Challenge After Ingraham, supra note 86, at 1470-71.
226. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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a public school has a substantive due process right to be free from se-
vere corporal punishment. The Ingraham Court emphasized that the
due process clause creates a liberty interest in the right to bodily integ-
rity. The Court determined that a student's interest in freedom from
the physical pain and humiliation of corporal punishment by school
officials is protectible as a fourteenth amendment liberty.227
It never has been judicially determined, nor is it contended here,
that disciplinary corporal punishment is a per se violation of the public
schoolchild's substantive due process rights.228  In Ingraham, the
Supreme Court made it clear that the substantive rights of public stu-
dents would not be abridged as long as the punishment was adminis-
tered within the limits of the common law privilege.229 Employing a
balancing approach, the Court determined that the interest supporting
some limited corporal punishment as potentially necessary to a child's
education outweighed the child's interest in personal security.230 It
thus appears that any constitutional right of due process is violated
when the degree of corporal punishment is excessive; that is, when it
exceeds that discipline reasonably related to the legitimate state interest
in maintaining order in the schools. 231
Schoolchildren are likely to be successful in substantive due pro-
cess challenges to excessive corporal punishment only if their interest in
227. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 15-9; Alexander, The New Prison Administrators and the
Court.- New Directions in Prison Law, 56 TEX. L. REV. 963, 977-78 (1978). The Ingraham
Court stated: "Where school authorities acting under color of state law, deliberately decide
to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical
. pain, we hold that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated." 430 U.S. at 674.
One noted commentator suggests that, despite Ingraham's posture as a procedural due pro-
cess case, its apparent conclusion that states must provide a remedy in tort for students who
are excessively punished also marks it as a case establishing substantive rights. Lupu, supra
note 116, at 1028 n.222. The Hall court seemed to agree: "Indeed, from this reservation [of
the substantive due process issue] the opposite implication seems compelled: that substan-
tive due process rights might be implicated in school disciplinary punishments even though
procedural due process is afforded by adequate state civil and criminal remedies, and
though cruel and unusual punishment is not implicated at all." Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d
607, 611 (1980) (footnote omitted). Justice White noted in his Ingraham dissent that "the
majority suggests that the [due process] Clause might . . . afford a remedy for excessive
spanking independently of the Eighth Amendment." 430 U.S. at 689 n.5. He stated, how-
ever, that if they "would recognize a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a depriva-
tion of 'liberty' flowing from an excessive paddling, the Court's opinion is merely a lengthy
word of advice with respect to the drafting of civil complaints." Id. In his opinion, if it were
"probable that schoolchildren would be entitled to protection under some theory of substan-
tive due process, the Court should. . . amend the grant of certiorari and set [the] case for
reargument." Id.
228. See 621 F.2d 607, 611 (4th Cir. 1980).
229. For a discussion of the common law privilege, see note 215 & text accompanying
notes 201-18 supra.
230. 430 U.S. at 676.
231. This was the contention of the appellants in Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d at 612.
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freedom from such punishment is recognized as a fundamental right. It
has been difficult for courts and commentators to make the judgment
regarding which, if any, unnamed interests are entitled to constitutional
protection as fundamental rights.23 2 Advocates of substantive due pro-
cess analysis frequently have relied on one or both of two sources, tra-
dition and contemporary values, to guide their fundamental rights
determinations.
Tradition and Contemporary Values as Sources of Fundamental Rights
Even critics of substantive due process theory recognize that
"[tiradition is an obvious place to seek fundamental values. 23 3 Many
of the cases use tradition as a guide in discovering preferred rights. 234
Justice Harlan stated the reason most eloquently:
[T]hrough the course of this Court's decisions, [due process] has rep-
resented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of re-
spect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty
and the demands of organized society. [The] balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as
the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A
decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No
formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and
restraint.235
Other justices also have stressed the importance of history voiced by
Justice Harlan.236
The use of traditional values as a source in identifying fundamen-
tal rights allows the Supreme Court to give due process protection to
liberties Americans have long assumed to be embraced within our
democratic heritage.23 7 Reference to traditional values helps ensure
that only these long-held liberties attain constitutional status.238 Fur-
thermore, the use of tradition to delimit "areas of constitutional liberty
has appealed to the Court's need for a sense of impartiality in the appli-
cation of substantive due process."2 39 Finally, because the starting
point is "a relatively objective history," recourse to tradition also keeps
232. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 55 (1962).
233. Ely, supra note 138, at 39-43. Professor Ely believes, however, that as with other
theories of fundamental values, tradition has obvious problems. Id.
234. Developments, supra note 66, at 1174. See cases cited at notes 235-36 infra.
235. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
236. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1043 n.304; see, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965)
(Goldberg, L, concurring): "Look at the traditions and collective conscience of our people
to determine whether a principle is so rooted there as to be ranked as fundamental." (quot-
ing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
237. Developments, supra note 66, at 1186.
238. See A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREmE COURT 113-14 (1976).
239. Developments, supra note 66, at 1187.
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the Court from having to develop its own philosophy of constitutional
liberty.240
A fundamental right also must be one that the nation continues to
cherish as paramount.241 Another measure in the search for fundamen-
tal rights therefore has been the current attitudes of the American peo-
ple.242  Courts using this standard are required to "ascertain the
contents of social conventions" 243 when applying the substantive due
process analysis. Although Supreme Court justices have occasionally
employed this consensus approach, they have done so with greater hes-
itation than when examining traditional values.244
Whether tradition or contemporary values are applied to the issue
of excessive corporal punishment in the public schools, it appears that a
schoolchild's interest in freedom from such discipline is a fundamental
right.
Historicall, American Institutions Have Recognized the Freedom from Severe
Corporal Punishment as One of Paramount Stature
Unenumerated fundamental rights often have been grouped under
the rubric of "privacy." 245 It would seem that any defensible definition
of privacy "must take the body as its first and most basic reference for
control over personal identity. '246 A challenge to an invasion of an
individual's bodily integrity by the state, such as corporal punishment,
is based on the failure of the state to respect the privacy inherent in that
person's physical being.247 The personal interest in bodily security
should be accorded protection as a right of privacy.
Americans traditionally have been skeptical about the constitu-
tionality of "practices which involve direct invasions of the body or the
240. See id.
241. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1041; Developments, supra note 66, at 1179.
242. See Perry, supra note 114, at 734-35. For a criticism of this position, see TRIBE,
supra note 114, § 15-3; Ely, supra note 138, at 43-52.
243. Perry, supra note 114, at 733-35. Another commentator has argued that
"[clonventional morality is the outer limit of the Court's legitimate authority and [that] a
proper understanding of substantive due process indicates . . . it is also much of what this
branch of constitutional law is all about." Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitu-
tional Double Standards.- Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 311 (1973).
244. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1047 n.315. The consensus methodology was employed in
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), in which the Court concluded: "Due process is
not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction. . . but by that whole community sense
of 'decency and fairness' that has been woven by common experience into the value of ac-
ceptable conduct. It is on this bedrock that this Court has established the concept of due
process." 352 U.S. at 436.
245. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 114, §§ 15-1 to -2.
246. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 15-9 (quoting Gerety, Redefning Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 233, 266 & n.119 (1977)).
247. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 15-10.
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imposition of physical pain or extreme physical discomfort." 248 The
Supreme Court identified the interest in bodily security more than
ninety years ago as "the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. ' 249 As the
court in Hall declared, "[The existence of this right of ultimate bodily
security-the most fundamental aspect of personal privacy-is unmis-
takably established in our constitutional decisions as an attribute of the
ordered liberty that is the concern of substantive due process. '250
Inlngraham, the Supreme Court also recognized that the "right to
be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on
personal security" was among those historic liberties intended to be
protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment, later incor-
porated into the fourteenth.25' The Court determined that the liberty
interest protected by the due process clauses had "always been thought
to encompass freedom from bodily restraint and punishment." 252
Not all actions that involve physical compulsion, an invasion of
the body, or an offensive touching will be prohibited as infringements
upon a constitutionally protected interest.253 Compulsory vaccina-
tion,254 extraction of narcotics from the rectum, 255 a compelled blood
test,256 and surgical removal of a bullet257 have been upheld when
shown to be necessary and when conducted with careful and regular
procedures.258 Nevertheless, the courts consistently have held that a
bodily intrusion raises a question of personal liberty, and the govern-
ment has been given the burden of providing substantial justification
for any physical invasion.259
248. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979).
249. Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (court did not have author-
ity to order a physical examination of a plaintiff in personal injury action). The Court cited
exceptional situations in which a bodily invasion was allowed under the English common
law in civil matters. For example, a woman who was suspected of pretending to be pregnant
in order to produce an heir might be compelled to submit to an examination. Id. at 252-53.
250. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (1980).
251. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 & n.42 (1977).
252. Id. at 673-74.
253. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 15-9.
254. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
255. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945
(1967); cf. Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968) ("mere suspicion" of nar-
cotics possession insufficient for forcible rectal search).
256. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
257. United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). But see Adams
v. Indiana, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974) (fourth
amendment prohibits forced surgical operation to remove bullet).
258. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 15-9.
259. See id.
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In Rochin v. Californi, 2 60 the Supreme Court held that the forced
pumping of a suspect's stomach was a clear violation of fourteenth
amendment due process because it "shocks the conscience," 26' al-
though it was the only means of obtaining the criminal evidence that
the police sought.262 The Court indicated that an individual's interest
in freedom from bodily intrusion is a fundamental interest. In finding
that the treatment violated the due process clause, Justice Frankfurter
recognized that the clause protected "personal immunities" that are
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. '263
Similarly, the court in Hall found the schoolchild's "constitution-
ally protected substantive due process right" 264 grounded "in those
constitutional rights given protection under the rubric of substantive
due process in such cases as Rochin ...: the right to be free of state
intrusions into realms of personal privacy and bodily security through
means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to shock the con-
science of a court." 265
Because of the importance attached to the privacy and integrity of
the body, however, a physical intrusion may be deemed objectionable
before the governmental invasion reaches the outrageous proportions
present in Rochin. It should be sufficient that the bodily intrusion was
"needlessly severe"2 66 to be considered "brutal and ...offensive to
human dignity"; 267 a physical invasion should not have to be so severe
as to shock or sicken to be found violative of important rights.2 68
Strong currents of respect for bodily integrity are embodied also in
260. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
261. Id. at 172. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954), limited Rochin to situa-
tions involving coercion, violence, or brutality to the person.
262. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 15-9. It would seem that the state's interest in obtaining
evidence for a criminal prosecution is much greater than its interest in keeping classrooms
orderly.
263. 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Cardozo, J., in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934) and in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); see Challenge After Ingraham,
supra note 86, at 1471.
264. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 612 (4th 1980).
265. Id. at 613. The court continued: "Clearly recognized in persons charged with or
suspected of crime and in the custody of police officers, we simply do not see how we can fail
also to recognize it in public school children under the disciplinary control of public school
teachers." Id.; see also Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing a
cause of action under § 1983 for substantive due process violations occasioned by beatings
by police or prison officials); King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1980) (accord);
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973) (accord).
266. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 15-9, at 915.
267. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
268. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 15-9. For a list of the factors Professor Tribe deems cru-
cial in determining needless severity, see id. at 917; cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
662 (1977) (listing factors to take into account in determining the reasonableness of corporal
punishment); Note, Murphy v. Kerrigan, supra note 87, at 584 (same).
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the eighth amendment. Although the eighth amendment has been held
not to apply to school children,269 this esteem for physical integrity nev-
ertheless underlies those values that the due process clause marks as
fundamental. The acknowledgment of this tie between the eighth
amendment and due process should answer charges by interpretivist
courts and commentators270 that the interest in freedom from excessive
corporal punishment is not one that the Constitution marks as
fundamental.
Lower courts have recognized that the eighth amendment and the
due process clauses all evidence a respect for bodily integrity. The Hall
court stated that "the rights to bodily security protected by the Eighth
Amendment and by substantive due process respectively are substan-
tially congruent as far as content is concerned."' 271 The court noted
that Ingraham denied the plaintiffs' eighth amendment claim because
of their status as schoolchildren rather than persons convicted of crime.
A denial on such a basis, the Hall court reasoned, does not decide that
the alleged conduct does not violate the claimant's substantive due pro-
cess rights. 272 Whatever force lay behind the argument denying school-
children the protection given criminals under the eighth amendment
does not apply here. As the petitioners in Ingraham argued, it "would
be anomalous. . . if schoolchildren could be beaten without constitu-
tional redress while hardened criminals suffering the same beatings
.. .might have a valid substantive due process claim. '273
As the Ingraham Court acknowledged, the due process clause im-
poses limits on punishment apart from those imposed by the eighth
amendment.274 Consequently, the fourteenth amendment's proscrip-
tion against severe or extraordinary punishment is not exactly coexten-
sive with that proscribed by the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause.275 In addition, substantive due process protections
are not limited to criminal offenders. A substantive due process analy-
sis thus goes further than the "contemporary values" and "human dig-
nity" tests of the eighth amendment.276
Another reason for determining that freedom from severe corporal
punishment is a traditionally protected right is the historic limitation
269. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977).
270. Developments, supra note 66, at 1168-71. For a discussion of the interpretivist posi-
tion, see note 142 & text accompanying notes 135-38, 141-44 supra.
271. 621 F.2d at 611 n.5.
272. Id.
273. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 669 (1977).
274. Id. at 671.
275. Alexander & Horton, supra note 183, at 1337 n.129.
276. Brief for Appellants at 10, Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Briefl. For a discussion of the eighth amendment tests, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976).
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on the excessive use of force on schoolchildren. Although the use of
corporal punishment as a method of disciplining students dates to colo-
nial times, its use has always been governed by the principle that
"[tleachers may impose reasonable but not excessive force to discipline
a child."'277 A long history of common and statutory law protects chil-
dren from severe physical punishment by educators.
In sum, both case law and the eighth amendment express our soci-
ety's long-held concern with an individual's bodily security. Although
the eighth amendment has been held not to apply to schoolchildren, no
such limitation inheres in the due process clause, which protects sub-
stantially identical rights. Historical statutory and common law restric-
tions on the imposition of corporal punishment upon public school
students also show a concern for a child's physical integrity. Case law,
statutory law, and the Constitution thus all support the conclusion that
Americans traditionally have regarded the claim to freedom from ex-
cessive corporal punishment as one of paramount stature.
Freedom from Severe Corporal Punishment Is an Important Value
Although corporal punishment was once a widely employed
method of discipline in this country in a variety of contexts, today it is
rarely used in public institutions outside the school.2 78 While there is
no consensus of opinion among either professional educators or the
public at large regarding the propriety of the continued use of corporal
punishment in schools, 2 7 9 "physical discipline continues to play a role
in the public education of schoolchildren in most parts of the
country." 280
There is evidence, however, that supports the view that severe cor-
poral punishment will no longer be condoned. Statutes often "indicate
majoritarian sentiment regarding the legitimacy and importance of
particular personal rights."' 28 ' Most states that have addressed the issue
have statutes authorizing the use of only moderate corporal punish-
ment.2 82 A widespread pattern of state legislation therefore seems to
support the liberty of the schoolchild to be free from all but moderate
corporal punishment. In addition, three states, at least forty-four cities
outside these states, and many school districts have legislative prohibi-
tions against the use of any corporal punishment in their public
schools. 283
277. 430 U.S. at 661 (emphasis added).
278. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300 (M.D.N.C.), afi'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
279. 430 U.S. at 660-61; Alexander & Horton, supra note 183, at 1328; Geiser, The Rights
of Children, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1027, 1050 (1977).
280. 430 U.S. at 660.
281. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 15-3.
282. 430 U.S. at 662. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
283. Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey have prohibited the use of corporal punish-
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Schools, administrators, and teachers treat the misbehaving stu-
dent differently; some schools and teachers commonly apply corporal
punishment, whereas others avoid it.284 The hesitancy to employ phys-
ical punishment appears to be largely due to the recognition that its
practice is of little utility in developing the desired qualities of personal
responsibility, self-discipline, and moral character in children.285 This
recognition reinforces the view that freedom from severe corporal pun-
ishment is desirable in modem American public schools.
The work of social science is another acceptable source for deter-
mining contemporary values.286 Almost all experts in education and
child psychology apparently agree that excessive corporal punishment,
resulting in broken bones, bruises, or disfigurement, should be prohib-
ited.2 7 A number of studies have noted the negative effects on children
caused by severe punishment.288 Some social science studies indicate
that even the use of moderate corporal punishment is not rationally
related to any legitimate educational objective.289 This data, abuses in-
volving corporal punishment, and modem theories of education have
prompted more than sixty anticorporal punishment groups and the Na-
tional Education Association to seek the complete elimination of cor-
meat in their public schools. MAINE REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 17-A, § 106(2) (1976); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 71, § 37G; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (1968); Challenge After Ingra-
ham, supra note 86, at 1449-50 & n.4.
284. Corporal Punishment, supra note 12, at 160 n.174.
285. See Johnson v. Department of Social Servs., 123 Cal. App. 3d 878 (1981).
286. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1048.
287. Alexander & Horton, supra note 183, at 1328 & n.98. See note 288 infra. Experts
also apparently agree that it is undesirable physically to punish "the 'wrong' schoolchild-
the child who is innocent of wrongdoing... or who is not emotionally equipped to handle
such punishment ... ." Alexander & Horton, supra note 183, at 1328. As the Court noted
in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975), "Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost
good faith, frequently act on the reports and advice of others; and the controlling facts and
the nature of the conduct under challenge are often disputed. The risk of error is not at all
trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or
interference with the educational process."
288. See, e.g., Hyman, Corporal Punishment in the Schools: An Overview of Theoretical
and Practical Issues, INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION, #23, Summer 1978; NATIONAL EDUCA-
TION ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CORPORAL PUNISHMENT (1972); see
also Cohen, Beating Children is as.American as .4pple Pie, 7 Hum. RIGHTS 24, 26-27 (1978)
(noting studies showing negative effects of corporal punishment). Among other factors, so-
cial science studies stress that the arbitrary and capricious use of corporal punishment in the
absence of due process remedies produces fear and an unquestioning obediience to authority
in many children. Research indicates that the imposition of severe physical force also can
result in behavior problems, decreased learning, and increased feelings of anxiety, helpless-
ness, and alienation. In addition, corporal punishment generates harmful side effects, evi-
denced particularly by counter-aggression against school property, teachers, and other
children. Brief, supra note 276, at 23-24.
289. See note 288 supra.
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poral punishment in United States public schools.290
Commentators have theorized that an interest that is highly valued
and has roots in American tradition should be afforded heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny in the face of any significant abridgement. Professor
Lupu argues that support for the idea of unenumerated fundamental
rights is reflected in the opinions of twentieth century Supreme Court
justices. 29' He concludes that the search for these rights "is for values
deeply embedded in the society, values treasured by both past and
present, values behind which the society and its legal system have un-
mistakably thrown their weight. ' 292 To determine whether a right is
fundamental, therefore, Professor Lupu proposes that the Court decide
whether "the claim satisfies two related tests:
"1) Historically, American institutions must have recognized the
liberty claim as one of paramount stature.
"2) Contemporary society must value the asserted liberty at a
level of high priority. '293
Although this test does not "completely answer the charge of judi-
cial revision of this Constitution, ' 294 Professor Lupu suggests that it
would maximize the legitimacy and minimize the risks of subjectivity
inherent in determining which rights are fundamental. 295 He concludes
that, if both prongs of the standard are satisfied, the Supreme Court
should not allow a state to interfere with the claimed liberty without
extraordinary justification.296
State legislation, school board regulations, social science data, and
expert opinion all support the conclusion that the claim to freedom
from severe physical punishment is one that the majority of Americans
believe should be protected. As the interest in freedom from excessive
corporal punishment also embodies values that Americans traditionally
have accorded great importance, this interest should be designated a
fundamental right.
Level of Scrutiny That Should Be Applied
When the Court deems the interest interfered with to be a "funda-
290. Brief, sufpra note 276, at 15, 23-24; Cohen, Beating Children is as American as Apple
Pie, 7 Hum. RIGHTs 24, 26-27 (1978).
291. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1040.
292. Id. (emphasis deleted); see also A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 113-14
(1976): "Constitutional rights ought not to be created under the Due Process Clause unless
they can be stated in principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the com-
munity and continuity over significant periods of time and to lift them above the level of the
pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and place."
293. Lupu, supra note 116, at 1040-41.
294. Id. at 1050.
295. Id. at 1039.
296. Id. at 1041; TBE, supra note 114, § 11-4.
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mental right," and it is burdened more than minimally, the government
must justify the state action by showing that it serves a "compelling
interest." The government must also demonstrate that the method used
to achieve the desired end is the least restrictive alternative available. 297
As a fundamental right, the interest of a schoolchild in freedom from
the infliction of severe corporal punishment therefore may be infringed
only if justified by a compelling state interest.
Whether the goal of maintaining classroom discipline is deemed a
"compelling" or merely a "legitimate" objective, severe corporal pun-
ishment apparently does not serve this state interest.298 Furthermore,
there are many other ways of disciplining children to maintain class-
room order. Students can be verbally chastised, isolated, or detained
during recess or after school. Teachers or school officials may give ex-
tra work, withhold privileges, or even suspend or expel a misbehaving
pupil.299 Even if corporal punishment is used, there is no evidence that
any punishment other than moderate physical chastisement is neces-
sary to the maintenance of orderly schoolrooms. Because severe corpo-
ral punishment is therefore not the least restrictive alternative to
attaining the governmental objective,300 it would have to be abolished
under the substantive due process analysis.
It is not clear, however, that a traditional fundamental rights anal-
ysis can be applied to minors. It is generally acknowledged that the
"power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond
the scope of its authority over adults. ' 30 1 Only recently has the
Supreme Court begun to articulate how important the state's asserted
interest must be before a minor's fundamental right can be constitu-
tionally abridged.302 In PlannedParenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth303 the Court recognized the state's broader authority to control
children's conduct. The Court refused, however, to uphold a state law
infringing a minor's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy, be-
cause the government could not establish "any significant state interest
297. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
298. Note, Murphy v. Kerrigan, supra note 87, at 584-85. See text accompanying notes
128-30 supra.
299. See NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON COR-
PORAL PUNISHMENT (1972).
300. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
301. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). See notes 62, 66, 70 & text ac-
companying notes 62-70 supra.
302. Developments, supra note 66, at 1238-39; see Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 692 (1977).
303. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). In Danforth, an abortion case, the Supreme Court struck down
provisions in a Missouri statute requiring the spouse's consent, and, in the case of an unmar-
ried woman under 18, parental consent, as an "absolute and possibly arbitrary veto...
Id. at 74.
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...that is not present in the case of an adult. '' 3°4 Danforth 's "signifi-
cant state interest" test was set forth only in dictum. Justice Brennan,
writing for a plurality of the Court, employed this theory again, how-
ever, in Carey v. Population Services International,30 5 which also impli-
cated a minor's decisional privacy rights. Justice Brennan concluded
that the standard, although "less rigorous than the 'compelling state
interest' test was appropriate. . . because of the States' greater latitude
to regulate the conduct of children." 3°6 The reduced scrutiny also was
considered proper because the claimed interest was one in decision-
making, and "the law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser
capability for making important decisions." 30 7 Other justifications for
this lesser scrutiny of state action have included the special vulnerabil-
ity of children and the importance of parental decisionmaking to the
role of childrearing.30 8
However persuasive these rationales may be in other areas, they
are not sufficiently compelling to override a child's interest in bodily
security.309 Severe corporal punishment is administered without regard
to any particular vulnerability of a child and causes pain and humilia-
tion. A parental choice exercised in favor of moderate corporal punish-
ment might be accorded deference; parental decisionmaking in favor of
the imposition of severe physical punishment should not be held to out-
weigh a child's fundamental right. In addition, the nature of the inter-
est does not implicate decisionmaking, although most schoolchildren
could, and undoubtedly would, choose not to be harshly punished. As
the justifications for reduced judicial scrutiny are not persuasive in this
area, the Court should require the state to demonstrate a "compelling"
interest when educators punish children severely.
The validity of the state interest in each decision "turns on the
ability of the state to prove that the means it has selected do in fact
relate to or achieve the desired end." 310 If it were concluded that the
right of a schoolchild to freedom from severe corporal punishment is
not fundamental, the state would still have to show that it bore a ra-
tional relation to a valid state objective. Although the stated goal of
maintaining classroom order is unquestionably legitimate, the rational-
304. Id. at 75.
305. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). In Carey, the Court invalidated a New York law that, among
other provisions, prohibited anyone other than a doctor from distributing contraceptives to
individuals under the age of 16.
306. Id. at 693 n.15.
307. Id.; see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-37 (1979).
308. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
309. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 39, at 164; see also Developments, supra note 66,
at 1240-41 (none of these rationales can override a fully competent minor's fundamental
right).
310. Rosenberg, supra note 95, at 107.
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ity of the connection between the means chosen and the legislative pur-
pose is tenuous.311 Severe physical punishment, resulting in missed
school days and bruised bodies, does not appear to be reasonably re-
lated to an educational objective. As the issue of the effectiveness of
corporal punishment is not resolved, some courts may find a rational
basis for the use of severe corporal punishment. A determination that a
child has a fundamental right to be free from such punishment would
avoid the possibility of such a decision. Furthermore, the governmen-
tal action in cases of severe corporal punishment conflicts with other
articulated goals of the states, which place great emphasis on the im-
portance of education 312 and on the protection of children from
abuse.313
Conclusion
Children can be severely beaten in our public schools without re-
course to any definite constitutional protections. By violating both the
traditions and contemporary values of our nation the infliction of ex-
cessive corporal punishment infringes upon a child's fundamental right
to his or her bodily security. As it serves no compelling state interest
and as there are less restrictive alternatives for achieving the state's ob-
jective of maintaining classroom discipline, severe corporal punishment
is a violation of a minor's substantive due process rights. The Fourth
Circuit in Hall v. Tawney314 declared that under certain circumstances
severe corporal punishment may violate a child's substantive due pro-
cess right. Although the Hall test, requiring malice and a beating
"shocking to the conscience," is too stringent, it clears the way for the
Supreme Court to declare severe corporal punishment of schoolchil-
dren a violation of substantive due process. If the Court does so, chil-
dren in public schools will be guaranteed personal security in an
important aspect of their lives.
Cynthia Denenholz Sweeney*
311. See Note, Murphy v. Kerrigan, supra note 87, at 592.
312. See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
313. Rosenberg, supra note 95, at 108; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 273a & d (West
1970 & Supp.). Present legal authority thus does not provide a simple formula for determin-
ing the level of state interest required to outweigh the degree of intrusion upon a child's
substantive due process right. One writer has suggested that the availability of an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny may be essential in future cases asserting that the use of corporal pun-
ishment to discipline schoolchildren violates substantive due process. The middle ground
suggested as available to the courts is to "enjoin the infliction of corporal punishment until
the responsible entity establishes guidelines." Challenge 4fter Ingraham, supra note 86, at
1459, 1472.
314. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
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